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KENTUCKY DEATH TAXES-
PUTTING A PRICE ON INHERITANCE
PREFACE
There has been very little litigation interpreting the Kentucky
inheritance tax law since its enactment in 1906.1 This lack of interpre-
tation, coupled with the vagueness of the statute and the Department
of Revenue's seeming unwillingness to adopt some form of regulations
to supplement the statute, has resulted in many headaches for the
practicing attorney in his attempts to properly plan estates. In fact,
because the federal estate tax is likely to be the decisive factor in
making an estate plan, and because the same steps which save federal
taxes will frequently result in a corresponding decrease in state taxes,
most practicing attorneys are more familiar with the federal estate tax
than with the Kentucky inheritance tax. Therefore, throughout this
note there will be comparisons between the federal and Kentucky
taxing provisions as a method of clarifying Kentucky's rather compli-
cated inheritance tax scheme.
Generally, when the estate involved is relatively small, i.e. $120,000
or less, Kentucky's inheritance tax will be the controlling consideration
in making an estate plan. For example, consider the situation in
which a decedent leaves a $120,000 estate to his wife. No federal
estate tax would be due because the decedent is allowed a marital
deduction2 on one half of the property left to his surviving spouse and
the tax on the remaining $60,000 can be reduced to zero by applying
the specific exemption.3 Thus, such an estate would only be subject to
the Kentucky inheritance tax, which in the case of a surviving wife
starts at $10,000.4
Chart 15 demonstrates the importance of the Kentucky inheritance
tax in relation to small estates.
I The original statute was enacted in 1906. The statute as it appears today
was enacted as § 4281a of CAnaoLes Ky. STAT. in 1936, redesignated as chapter
140 of Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] at the time of the general re-
vision in 1942, and amended in 1948 to change the inheritance tax to an estate
tax for estates in excess of three million dollars.2 INT. Ray. CODE of 1954 [hereinafter cited as CODE] § 2056.
3 Id. § 2052.
4KRS § 140.080(1)(a) (1960) grants a $10,000 exemption to the wife's
inheritable interest; § 140.080(1) (b) grants a $5,000 exemption to the husband's
inheritable interest.5 This chart was compiled by the Legislative Research Commission from
8,858 returns filed with the Kentucky Department of Revenue for a twelve month
period, 1959-60. CO.movALTH oF KENTUcKY LEGISLATuRE RESEARCH CoM-
MsSION RESEACH REPorq, INmmrr. xcE AN ESTATE TAxATION m K-rTUC'Y 38
(1961).
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SIZE OF ESTATE LESS THAN $30,000 TO $60,000 TO ABOVE
$30,000 60.000 100,000 $100,000 AVERAGE
Percentage of Returns
Subject to Ky. Tax 33.43 97.32 100.00 99.31 73.35
Percentage of Returns
Subject to Federal Tax - 2.02 51.58 92.05 35.90
Kentucky Death Tax as
a % or the Total Tax 100.00 97.00 67.52 21.90 23.53
Chart 1
Analysis Of Death Tax Liability
INTRODUCION
To introduce the subject of the Kentucky inheritance tax it may
be helpful to consider briefly some of the basic ideas about death
taxes. Before attempting to make fine judicial distinctions between
estate and inheritance taxes, death taxes in general may be defined as
taxes levied on the transmission of property at death or on the trans-
mission of property in which the occasion of the transfer is so closely
related to the death of the decedent that it comes within the general
scope of such taxation. Although the tax is measured by the property
transferred at death, it is important to note that the tax is not levied
on the property itself but on the transfer or the transmission of such
property. Death is the occasion and the transfer of property to the
living is the object on which the tax is immediately imposed. This
distinction is not merely technical but has some rather far reaching
practical effects, particularly concerning the Constitutional nature and
validity of death taxes.
Death taxes, both estate and inheritance, are designated as excise
taxes-a term which is used to describe or designate a tax that is
levied on a privilege or an occasion or happening rather than on
property directly. This designation is of the essence in the Consti-
tutional field because a direct tax is subject to Constitutional limita-
tions or restrictions such as apportionment 6 and equality, where-
as an excise tax is not. On this basis the Supreme Court upheld
the Constitutionality of a federal inheritance tax in Knowlton v.
Moore7 and later the federal estate tax in New York Trust Company v.
Eisner.8
The fundamental nature of the estate and the inheritance tax is
more easily understood if one keeps in mind that "death is the gene-
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
7 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
8 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
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rating source from which the particular taxing power takes its being."9
This concept not only permits the tax to be based on the actual estate
which the decedent owned at death, but somtimes on property no
longer owned at death, as in the case of transfers made in contempla-
tion of death or the vesting of a joint estate through right of survivor-
ship.'0 That is, even though the transfer may have been completed
during the life of the decedent, the tax will be imposed on the trans-
mission of the property if the transfer was testamentary in character
and had an immediate relation to the death of the decedent.
Death taxes are imposed under two principal types of levy. An
estate tax is a tax imposed upon the privilege of transmitting property
at death and is called a tranfer tax." An inheritance tax is a tax im-
posed upon the privilege of receiving property from a decedent at
death and is called a succession tax.'2
Although both of these taxes are theoretically identical, there are
substantial administrative differences between them. Under the estate
tax, the levy is directed against the net estate as an entirety and the net
estate is the measure of the tax.13 The rates are progressive and de-
pend on the size of the net estate. There is no concern with the pro
rata share of each beneficiary or, except in the case of a surviving
spouse,14 with the relationship between the decedent and the bene-
ficiary. On the other hand, an inheritance tax is a tax on the right to
receive property and, therefore, the bequests to each beneficiary are
treated separately.' 5 The inheritance tax rates are progressive but, un-
like the estate tax, they may fluctuate depending upon the relationship
between the decedent and the beneficiary.' 6 Since the inheritance tax
is calculated on each specific bequest at a progressive rate, the total tax
may be reduced by increasing the number of beneficiaries.
The necessity of valuing the interest of each beneficiary according
to his "share" and relationship to the decedent can result in compli-
cations as well as additional computations. Therefore, it is generally
agreed that the estate tax is less complicated to administer. But, in
spite of its comparative ease of administration, only the federal govern-
9 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 56 (1900).
10 Gifts in contemplation of death are taxed under CODE § 2035 andi KRS §
140.020 (1942). Joint interests in property are taxed under CODE § 2040 and
KRS § 140.050 (1942).
11 C. LOWNDES & R. nAm, FEDmEAL ESTATE AND G=r TAxEs 2 (2d ed.
1962).
12 Id.
23 CODE § § 2001, 2051.
14 Id. § 2056.
15 KRS § 140.010 (1942). Under this provision the tax is computed upon
the full and fair cash value, at the time of death, of the share that passes or
accrues to each beneficiary, subject to his exemption.
'GKRS § 140.070 (1948).
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ment and eleven states17 use the estate tax system. The remainder of
the states, with the exception of Nevada which has no death taxes, use
an inheritance tax. In order to take advantage of the maximum federal
credit allowed, many of these states, including Kentucky,", use some
form of estate tax as well.
The General Assembly of Kentucky first enacted a five per cent in-
heritance tax in 1906. The levy was on property ". . . which shall be
transferred by deed, grant, sale or gift, made in contemplation of the
death of the grantor or bargainor, or intended to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment after such death."' 9 There have been subsequent
revisions in rates, exemptions and inclusive provisions, but the general
levying provision quoted above remains substantially the same in the
present section 140.010 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes [hereinafter
KRS]. In thirty-six sections, the statute levies the tax, lists the types
of transfers covered, establishes exemptions, deductions, credits and
rates, and describes the administration of the tax. Basically, the tax
is imposed at a graduating rate of from two to sixteen per cent upon
three classes of beneficiaries, each with different exemptions. 20
Kentucky's inheritance tax was upheld in the early case of Booth's
Executor v. Commonwealth.2' The executor attacked the statute on
the grounds that the Kentucky Constitution included no provision
authorizing the imposition of such tax, that the statute did not tax
property uniformly as required by the Constitution and that the statute
would result in discrimination and inequality because of the classifica-
tion of beneficiaries. The Court answered the first contention by
saying:
As the privilege of right to take property by inheritance or devise
is not a natural or inherent right of persons, but is a creature of
the law, it is subject to regulation by statute; and the imposition
of a tax as incident to the right is authorized under our govern-
mental system, when not expressly forbidden by the State Con-
stitution .... 22
17 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Utah.
-18KRS § 140.180 (1942) levies an estate tax on all estates equal to the
amount by which the credits for state death taxes allowable under the federal tax
law exceeds the tax levied under KRS § 140.010 (1942), less the discount allowed
under KRS § 140.210 (1942), if taken by the taxpayer. Kentucky has another
estate tax provision which applies when the fair cash value of the net estate
equals three million dollars or more. KRS § 140.065 (1948) provides that such
estates are only subject to the estate tax levied by this provision which shall be
equal to the amount of the credit allowable for state death taxes under the ap-
plicable federal tax law.
19Ky. AcTs, ch. 22, at 240 (1906).20 KRS § § 140.070 140.080 (1948).
21180 Ky. 88, 118 S.W. 61 (1908).
22Id. at 97-98, 113 S.W. at 63.
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The Court went on to say that the tax need not be uniform since the
tax was on the transmission of property and not on the property itself
and that regardless of how many separate classes of beneficiaries were
established the tax was not considered to be discriminatory as long as
it operated impartially upon all persons within a classification.23
TAANsFERs SuBJEcr To TAx
The primary purpose of the federal estate tax and the Kentucky
inheritance tax is to tax the transfer of property at death. More
fits of possession and enjoyment of property from the dead to the
specifically, their purpose is "to tax the shifting of the economic bene-
living."2 4 The federal statute accomplishes this by defining the gross
estate in section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [herein-
after Code] as including all property that the decedent owned at the
time of his death, by determining the taxable estate under section
2051 and by imposing the tax on the taxable or net estate under
section 2001.
The above sections, without more, would be limited to taxing
testamentary and intestate transfers since the gross estate only in-
cludes the value of the property that the decedent owns at the time
of his death. This would permit a decedent to reduce his gross estate
by making a technical transfer of property during his life while re-
taining control and enjoyment of that property until his death. Thus,
he would be passing economic benefits at his death but avoiding the
tax since he would not own the property at his death.
To prevent such results Congress enacted the so-called "inclusive"
provisions of the statute for the purpose of supplementing and plug-
ging the loopholes in section 2031. These inclusive provisions, Code
sections 2034-2042, provide for the equivalent of testamentary transfers
and make the value of such property includible in the gross estate.
The Kentucky statute also has inclusive provisions25 and, consequently,
if a beneficiary receives property from a decedent other than by will
or intestacy it will be taxed if the transfer had substantial characteri-
stics of being testamentary.
There have been Constitutional fights over the various "inclusive"
provisions but space will not permit a survey of each of those con-
siderations. While these provisions have been held Constitutional, the
manner in which they are administered and the various detailed fact
situations may continue to be a fruitful area of litigation.
23 Id. at 104, 113 S.W. at 65.
24 Gregg v. Commissioner. 54 N.E.2d 169, 170 (Mass. 1944).
25KRS §§ 140.020-140.050.
KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL
INCLUSIVE PROVISIONS
A. Introduction
The purpose of this introduction is to point out to the reader where
we have been and where we are going. Other than the general back-
ground, the reader should realize at this point that both the federal
and the Kentucky statutes have a basic provision of general coverage
that imposes a tax on the value of property transferred at death.
Quite obviously these basic provisions include the value of property
that is transferred by will or by the laws of intestate succession. It
has also been pointed out that under both statutes the substantial
equivalents of testamentary transfers are also taxed under the so-called
"inclusive" provisions. Most importantly, the reader should realize that
before a death tax can be levied there must be identifiable property
(such as real property or trangible or intangible personal property),
the decedent must have an interest in that property and the transfer
must be one that is taxable under the statute.
What remains is to develop an understanding of the inclusive pro-
visions, which determine what transfers are subject to tax and the pro-
visions dealing with rates, deductions and exemptions. Therefore, the
remaining portion of this note will be an amplification and explanation
of these provisions. There is no attempt to be exhaustive, but rather
to explain the operation of each section, to discuss enough cases to
bring into focus the main problems involved and, hopefully, to make
suggestions that will lessen or avoid the problems.
Chart 2 is a schematic portrayal of the federal estate tax pro-
visions.26 Asterisks have been placed next to the inclusive provisions to
enable the reader to see their place, purpose and function in federal
estate tax scheme. Chart 3 portrays the Kentucky inheritance tax pro-
visions for the purposes of comparison. Again, asterisks have been
placed next to the inclusive provisions.
For the most part, the comparison is valid. However, the reader
must keep in mind the basic differences between an estate tax and an
inheritance tax and realize that the block representing "gross in-
heritance" refers to the total inheritance of a single beneficiary. Also,
it should be noted that the federal inclusive provisions taxing retained
reversionary interests and annuities have no counterparts in the
Kentucky statute. Nevertheless, it is submitted that both reversionary
interests and annuities are subject to the Kentucky inheritance tax and,
therefore, they will be discussed. Finally, note that the Kentucky
2 6 Chart 2 was prepared by Professor Robert G. Lawson of the University
of Kentucky College of Law who kindly consented to its publication here.
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*1 I1140.030 (2)1
Lnanc
statute, unlike the federal, has no specific exemption or marital de-
duction.2 7
B. Gifts in Contemplation of Death
Gifts that are made in contemplation of death are subject to the
federal estate2 8 and the Kentucky inheritance 9 tax. Unlike the Ken-
tucky statute, Chapter 12 of the Code imposes a gift tax on all gifts
made during life and later grants a credit if it is determined that the
value of the gift is includible in the gross estate because, e.g., it was
made in contemplation of death. The purpose of the federal gift tax
provisions is, of course, to supplement the federal estate tax provisions
by taxing gifts whose value would otherwise make up a part of the
gross estate. The federal gift tax as well as a man's natural reluctance
to lose control over his property before his death deters decedents
from completely depleting their estate prior to their deaths in order to
avoid federal and state death taxes. Also, a determination that a gift
was made in contemplation of death would subject it to both the
estate and the inheritance tax.
The purpose of the federal and state provisions taxing transfers in
contemplation of death is to reach substitutes for testamentary dis-
positions and thereby prevent avoidance of the estate and inheritance
tax provisions. The problem in this area has been in determining when
a transfer was made in contemplation of death.
While the interpretation of the phrase ['in contemplation of
death'] has not been uniform, there has been agreement upon
certain fundamental considerations. It is recognized that the
reference is not to the general expectation of death which all
entertain. It must be a particular concern, giving rise to a definite
motive. The provision is not confined to gifts causa mortis, which
are made in anticipation of impending death, are revocable, and
are defeated if the donor survives the apprehended peril.30
A gift then is made in contemplation of death when it is motivated by
the thought of death. The "thought of death" lies somewhere between
two extremes, namely, the knowledge that each of us has that we will
die and the knowledge that death is imminent. Possibly a more help-
ful way of viewing the area between the two extremes would be to
think in terms of determining whether the decedent's motive in making
27 KRS § 140.080(1)(a) (1960) gives a surviving wife a $10,000 exemption
and 140.080(1) (b) gives a surviving husband $5,000 exemption. However, these
exemptions are insignificant when compared with the specific exemption and
marital deduction under the federal CODE.2 8 CODE § 2035.29 KRS § 140.020 (1942).
3 0 Basket v. Hassell, 107 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1882).
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the transfer was to achieve some objective after his death. At any rate,
it should be clear that the fact that death ensues shortly after the
gift or that a person does not believe himself to be in danger of im-
mediate death is not determinative. The question is necessarily sub-
jective and the answer must always be found in the decedent's motive
in making the transfer. Nevertheless, in determining the subjective
motive the courts look to the objective criteria3' presented by all of
the circumstances surrounding the transfer. Some of the objective
factors that have been considered by the courts are the age, health, at-
titude and propensities of the decedent, the amount of the property
transferred in proportion to the amount of property retained, the
relation of the donees to the decedent, past gift patterns, the nature of
the property transferred and the nature of the decedents motives.32
A list of all the possible objective factors would only be limited by
the number of possible fact situations and combinations of circum-
stances. Finally, when motives associated with life and motives as-
sociated with death are both responsible for a transfer, the dominant
and impelling motive of the decedent in making the transfer will be
determinative.33
The first Kentucky provision taxing gifts made in contemplation of
death was enacted in 1924. It provided that every transfer of property
within three years of death was conclusively presumed to have been
a transfer in contemplation of death and taxable.34 This provision was
held unconstitutional in State Tax Commission v. Robinson's Ex-
ecutor.35 In 1936, the General Assembly changed the wording to
"shall be construed prima facie to have been made in contemplation of
death"36 and thus placed the burden of overcoming the statutory pre-
sumption on the person claiming the gift. This is the wording of the
present KRS 140.020(2) which also provides that it is a question of
fact for the proper tribunal whether a transfer made more than three
years prior to the decedent's death was made in contemplation of
death.
With the exception of the conclusive presumption, there have been
no federal or state Constitutional problems with taxing gifts in con-
templation of death. The primary difference between the federal and
the Kentucky provisions concerns transfers made more than three
3' Estate of Johnson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 680, 688 (1948).
32 Id.
33 United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 115 (1931).
34KY. AcTs, ch. III, at 331 (1924).
35234 Ky. 415, 28 S.W.2d 491 (1930).3 6 Ky. ACTS. (Special Revenue Session), ch. 8, at 104 (1936), Ky. STAT. §
428a-13 (Carroll, 1936).
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years prior to the donor's death. Under the federal statute3 7 there is a
conclusive presumption that gifts made more than three years prior
to the donor's death are not made in contemplation of death, while
under the Kentucky statute it is question of fact for the proper tri-
bunal.
C. Incomplete Transfers
In addition to taxing gifts in contemplation of death or "complete"
transfers, KRS 140.020 (1) also attempts to tax inter vivos, "incomplete"
transfers, i.e., retained interests. It uses the old language of the federal
estate tax Code: ".... transfer intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death:' This provision specifically includes trans-
fers with a retained life estate and transfers with a retained power to
designate who shall enjoy the property or the income therefrom. It
also specifically includes transfers over which the decedent retained a
power to revoke.
The federal statute no longer taxes incomplete transfers under one
section but has specific sections for each type of incomplete transfer.
Retained life estates and retained powers to designate who shall en-
joy the property or income therefrom are dealt with under Code
section 2036. Section 2037 covers retained reversionary interests that
exceed five per cent of the value of the property and section 2088
deals with revocable transfers.
It is not clear whether the language of the Kentucky statute in-
cludes the reversionary interests that are taxed under Code section
2037. This is the kind of interest that had been included under the
old federal Code language by the case law.38 There has been no Ken-
tucky case directly in point, but a recent Court of Appeals decision 9
would seem to indicate that retained reversionary interests would be
subject to tax. The Court of Appeals addressed itself to the meaning
of the pharse "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after death." The Court indicated that it was sufficient to impose the tax
when the beneficiary did not come into possession or enjoyment until
the death of the decedent if some incident of ownership passed from
the decedent at death. Under this interpretation, Kentucky would tax
reversionary interests but, unlike section 2037, without regard to
whether the reversionary interest exceeded five per cent of the value
of the property. However, it would seem that the Kentucky legislature
3 7 CODE, § 2035(b).13 8 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
39 Kentucky Department of Revenue v. American Nat'l Bank, 425 S.W.2d
281 (1968).
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should give some thought to enacting a similar requirement so as to
prevent the taxation of possible reversions that are so remote as to be
merely theoretical.
D. Life Insurance
Under certain circumstances both the federal 40 and Kentucky
statutes tax the proceeds of insurance policies on the life of the
decedent. KRS § 140.030(2), the relevant Kentucky provision, is less
complicated and affords more favorable tax treatment than does the
federal provision. The only time that proceeds of an insurance policy
will be subject to the Kentucky inheritance tax is when they are
payable to the decedent or his estate. Even though the proceeds are
payable to the decedent or his estate they will pass tax free if they are
payable under a United States Government or National Service life in-
surance policy issued by or through the federal government.
The three cases41 that have dealt with this provision indicate that
it is as straightforward as it appears to be and that its purpose is to
tax life insurance proceeds which actually pass through the insured's
estate by reason of his death or testamentary disposition. In all these
cases the beneficiaries of the policies were the trustees of an inter
vivos trust created by the decedent. In the Luckett42 case an interpreta-
tion of the following statutory language was involved:
The proceeds of an insurance policy payable to a . . . trustee of
a designated beneficiary shall be tax-free.43
The controversy centered on the word "designated" and the question
was whether the beneficiaries under the t.-ust had to be designated in
the insurance policy. The Court said that the statute required only that
some beneficial interest be created in someone other than the insured
prior to his death and that it was sufficient if the beneficiaries could
be identified from the trust arrangement. 44
In the Kentucky Trust Company45 case the trust agreement gave
the life income beneficiary the power to appoint the remainder on her
death. The Department of Revenue took the position that the power
of appointment made the insurance proceeds taxable because KRS
140.040(2) provides for the valuation of property which passes at the
death of the donor under a power of appointment. The Court said:
40 CODE § 2041.
41 Kentucky Bd. of Tax App. v. Estate of Porter, 422 S.W.2d 895 (1968);
Kentucky Trust Co. v. Department of Revenue, 421 S.W.2d 854 (1967); Luckett
v. First Nat'1 Lincoln Bank, 409 S.W.2d 518 (1966).4 2 Luckett v. First Nat'l Lincoln Bank, 409 S.W.2d 518 (1966).
43 KRS § 140.080(2) (1956).44 Luckett v. First Natl Lincoln Bank, 409 S.W.2d 518 at 521 (1966).45 Kentucky Trust Co. v. Department of Revenue, 421 S.W.2d 854 (1967).
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[T]he power granted is simply a beneficial interest in the proceeds.
It is not carved out of the estate of the deceased and has no signifi-
cance or value apart from the property to which it attaches. The
statute declares the insurance proceeds tax-free. We must accept
this plain direction. 46
This same result was reached in the Porter47 case which presented
In considering the proceeds of life insurance, the estate planner's
greatest concern will have to be with the federal statute since, under
Code section 2042, life insurance proceeds are not only taxed when
payable to the insured or his estate, but also, when the insured pos-
sessed any of the "incidents of ownership" in the policies at death.
Since an insured may want to divest himself of the incidents of owner-
ship and continue to pay the premiums on the policies, an estate
planner has to be aware of the ramifications of these acts under the
federal gift tax provisions. 48 For example, a gift of an insurance policy
in trust and premium payments in subsequent years will not qualify
for the annual exclusion if the gift to the beneficiary is a future
interest.49 The main thing to remember in estate planning is to divest
the insured of all "incidents of ownership," including the power to
designate the beneficiary, in such a way that the proceeds can not
return to him or his estate. This is usually accomplished by naming
secondary beneficiaries and providing that in no event are the proceeds
to return to the insured or his estate.
E. Annuities
The existing Kentucky statute makes no mention of annuities, but
the Department of Revenue has claimed that they are taxable. In
fact, the Kentucky inheritance tax form5 provides in Schedule F that
annuity contracts that continue payments after the death of the
decedent are taxable and must be included in the tax return.
In attempting to tax annuities the Department of Revenue relies
on a pre-1954 federal Code theory. Prior to the enactment of section
2039 into the Code the Commissioner of Internal Reveune would at-
tempt to tax survivor annuities under section 2037 (transfers intended
to take effect at death) or section 2033 (property owned at death).
Section 2033 is the general coverage provision of the federal statute
46 Id. at 856.47 Kentucky Bd. of Tax App. v. Estate of Porter, 422 S.W.2d 895 (1968).
an indistinguishable set of facts.
4 8 CODE ch. 12.
49 CODE § 2058(b).
GO Commonvealth of Kentucky, Department of Revenue, Inheritance and
Estate Tax Return 63A120.
KENTUcxY LAW JOURNAL
and it has its counterpart in KRS § 140.010. Section 2037 is com-
parable to KRS § 140.020.
The federal government had little success under these theories and
the Kentucky Department of Revenue has had little more. In Ken-
tucky Department of Revenue v. American National Bank,51 the Com-
monwealth was relying on the theory of "possession or enjoyment at
death" under KRS §§ 140.010 and 140.020. The Court held, however,
that the mere fact that the beneficiary did not come into possession or
enjoyment until death was not enough to impose the tax. There must
also be some incidents of ownership passing from the decedent at
death.52 Nevertheless, the Department of Revenue still maintains its
position and it may be less expensive to pay the tax on the annuity
than to get involved in litigation for failing to pay it
F. Joint Property
Taxation of jointly held property passing from the decedent to the
survivor is easily determined under the Kentucky inheritance tax
statute. KRS § 140.050 covers all types of joint ownership, including
joint tenancies, tenancies by the entirety, tenancies in common, and
joint bank accounts. The effect of the statute is to treat all joint
property, for inheritance tax purposes, as tenancies in common. As a
result, the surviving joint tenant is treated as if he inherited one half
of the property from the deceased. In other words, the respective
contributions toward purchasing the jointly held property are ir-
relevant.
The federal estate tax provision53 differs in that the portion of the
jointly held property to be included in the decedents gross estate is
based on the percentage of his contribution to the total cost of the
property. This percentage is applied against the fair market value of
the entire property on the date of the decedents death. Whether
treatment would be more favorable under the federal or Kentucky pro-
vision would depend on whether the largest or smallest contributor
died first.
51425 S.W.2d 281 (1968).
52 Id. at 282.
53 CODE, § 2040.54 On determining the portion of jointly held property that will be in-
cludible in the decedent's gross estate the CODE looks to the original source of
the property. CODE section 2040 assumes the jointly held property originally be-
longed to the decedent and gives the taxpayer the burden of proving that part
of the property "originally belonged" to the surviving joint owner. The taxpayer
must show further that the surviving joint owner's contribution to the tenancy
and the consideration with which it was acquired was not received from the
decedent for less than adequate consideration.
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KRS § 140.055 deals with the joint ownership of United States
bonds. If such bonds were received by the joint tenants other than by
purchase for full consideration in money, they are to be taxed just as
other joint property under KRS § 140.050. However, if they were
purchased by one or both of the joint owners, the taxation is de-
pendent upon the respective contributions of the two parties. If the
deceased made all of the contribution, then the total amount of the
bond will be taxable to the survivor.
G. Powers Of Appointment
The provisions taxing powers of appointment are the most difficult
to understand-this is particularly true of the Kentucky provision which
is a product of amendment and addition. The first statute was enacted
in 1924 and was amended and added to in 1986, 1942 and 1948.55
This tacking process, as opposed to a complete redraft into a smoothly
integrated whole, is not only responsible for the piece-meal appearance
of the provision but also for the confusion and inconsistencies that
have surrounded it. It is submitted that the court decisions, briefs
and other writings on the subject have done little more than add to the
confusion, perhaps even more so than is warranted by the statute. At
any rate, a person today can find authority for almost any position he
wishes to take regarding taxation of powers of appointment.5 6 For
these reasons and in the interests of simplicity, the Kentucky provision
should be revised. However, the provision is not beyond compre-
hension and an attempt will be made to explain it.
The purpose of the federal and Kentucky statutes is to prevent
avoidance of death taxes by the use of powers of appointment when
they are created and/or exercised in such a way as to make them
the substantial equivalents of testamentary transfers. A power of ap-
pointment is created when the owner of property gives another person
the power to dispose of the property subject to the limitations of the
55 Ky. AcTs, ch. HI, at 831 (1924); Ky. AcTs, ch. 8, at 104 (Special Revenue
Session 1936); Ky. AcTs, ch. 204, at 895 (1942). Ky AcTs, ch. 96, at 225 (1948).
The orginal statute and amendments thereto have been construed in Ream v.
Department of Revenue, 314 Ky. 539, 236 S.W.2d 462 (1951); Allen's Ex'r v.
Howard, 804 Ky. 280, 200 S.W.2d 484 (1947); Reeves v. Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co., 293 Ky. 544, 169 S.W.2d 621 (1943); and Commonwealth v.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 285 Ky. 1, 146 S.W.2d 3 (1940).50 For example, the Legislative Research Commission states that Kentucky
taxes the full value of the property subject to the power twice, once on the death
of the donor and again on the death of the donee. ComiONwEALTH OF KEN-
TUcKY LEGISLATION RESEARCH COMISSION, ImErANCE AIn ESTATE TAXATION
N KENTucK 14 (1960). Another authority says that if the property subject to
the power is taxed on the death of the donor it will not be taxed on the death
of the donee. CCH INH., ESTATE AND GFT TAX REPORT, 11 1540.
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power. The creator or donor of the power can create either a general
or special57 power of appointment in the holder or donee of the power.
The donee holds a general power of appointment when he can ap-
point the property to anyone he chooses or to a limited group
which includes the donee, his estate or his creditors. If the donee is
limited to the extent that he cannot appoint himself, his estate or his
creditors then he is said to possess a special power of appointment.
The persons who take the property under an exercised power of ap-
pointment are referred to as appointees, while those who receive the
property when the donee fails to exercise his power are referred to as
takers. This process is portrayed as follows:
exercise
-Appointees
Donor - Donee 'non-exercise
L-Takers
As previously indicated, tax consequences may vary depending
upon how the power of appointment was created and exercised. The
donor will create the power during his lifetime or by will and the
power will be general or special and may or may not be accompanied
by a life estate in the donee. The donee will either, during his life-
time or by his will, exercise his power of appointment, or die without
having exercised it, or allow it to lapse. In the latter two situations the
takers will most likely be the intestate heirs of the donor unless the
donor has expressly provided who the takers should be in the event
the donee fails to exercise his power. These then are all of the pos-
sibilities for creation and exercise and their effect on tax consequences
will be discussed shortly.
It is important to note that under substantive property law58 the
donee does not have title to the property over which he holds a power
of appointment. Title remains in the donor until it vests in the ap-
pointees or takers and the donee is considered the intermediary or
conduit through which the title flows. Conceptually then, traditional
property law views the vesting of title in the appointees or takers as a
transfer from the donor, not the donee.
In the absence of a specific provision this manner of viewing the
process could, under certain circumstances, result in tax avoidance.
For example, if a testator left his son a life estate in and a general
57 For a discussion of the distinction between general and special powers of
appointment and their treatment under the CODE, see C. LowNDES & R. KuAmza,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs 262 (2d ed. 1962).
58 For a general discussion of powers of appointment under substantive
property law see T. BERGEN & P. HAsEELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTuRE INTERESTS 152-82 (1966).
[Vol. 58
power of appointment over a piece of property and the son exercised
his power by will in favor of his children, there would only be death
taxes on the one transfer from the testator to his grandchildren. In
reality there were two transfers which should have been subject to
tax since what the son received, enjoyed during his lifetime, and
transferred on his death was a virtual fee simple ownership. Ad-
ditionally, a problem of complexity would result under the Kentucky
inheritance tax scheme since the relationship that will determine
rates59 and exemptions 60 will not be known until the ultimate bene-
ficiaries of the property are determined. This may be several years
after the death of the donor because of the intervening life estate of
the donee. However, these problems only result from viewing the
process under substantive property law. What Kentucky has done is
to legislate around them.
The Kentucky inheritance tax treatment of powers of appointment
is set out in the five subsections of KRS § 140.040. What the statute
has done is to create two taxable events, one when the power is
created and another when it is exercised. The power is taxed when
created only if it is created by will; and it is taxed when it passes from
the donee to the ultimate distributee only if the power is exercised by
will or the donee fails to exercise his power. If the power is created
and exercised inter vivos, there will be no inheritance tax because
there will have been no transfer at death.
Subsection 2 deals with powers created by the donor in his will.
It uses the rates and exemptions in effect at the death of the donor.
As indicated above, unless the power is exercised at the death of the
donor the ultimate distributee may not be known for several years.
Subsection 2 solves this problem by choosing a prospective beneficiary
and calculating the rates and exemptions on the basis of this choice.
The tax is levied against the corpus which the power controls. If it
subsequently develops that the wrong beneficiary was chosen, then
appropriate adjustments will be made at that time. The selection of a
beneficiary at the death of the donor is somewhat arbitrary, but
without this selection it would be impossible to calculate the tax
until the donee exercised the power. The relationship which governs
the rates and exemptions is the relationship between the donee and
the prospective beneficiary.
A typical example of how subsection 2 is applied would be where
A by his will creates a life estate in B with a general power of ap-
pointment over the remainder. On A's death the value of the life estate
59 KBS § 140.070 (1948)60 KRS § 140.080 (1960).
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would be calculated by the use of mortality tables and B would be
taxed for it under the general taxing provisions. The remainder would
also be taxed on A's death and the tax would be levied against the
property. Before the tax could be determined, it would be necessary to
choose a prospective beneficiary who would most likely be B or his
family. If C, B's son, is chosen as the most likely beneficiary, the rate
and exemption would be determined by the relationship between
B and C. The rate and exemption applied in this situation would be
the rate and exemption that was in effect at A's death. Had this been
a special power of appointment, the relationship between the class
and B would govern since the class would be chosen as the most likely
beneficiary.
In the preceding discussion, only the taxation of a power created
by will has been considered. This is the first taxable event. The second
taxable event occurs when the donee fails to exercise his power or
exercises it in his will. However, it is submitted that this event will not
be taxed where there has already been a tax levied on the first event
under subsection 2. Subsection 1 makes it possible to tax the second
event by treating the donee as the absolute owner of the property
controlled by the power. This treatment is directly contrary to sub-
stantive property concepts and if it were not for subsection 1, this
event could not be taxed.
In most situations the donor will name takers in case the donee
fails to exercise his power. Subsection 1 treats the failure of the donee
to exercise his power as a transfer from the donee to the takers. When
this occurs the rates and exemptions applied are those in effect at the
donee's death. The relationship that governs for purposes of deter-
mining the rates and exemptions is the relationship between the
donee and the takers.
When the donee exercises the power by will, subsection 1 treats
this as a transfer from the donee to the appointees. Again, the ap-
plicable rates and exemptions are those in effect at the donees death
and the governing relationship is the one existing between the donee
and appointees.
Up to this point the discussion has considered subsections 1 and
2 separately. The real difficulty arises when both subsections are ap-
plicable. Subsection 2 is not applicable unless the power is created by
the will of the donor and subsection 1 is not applicable unless the
donee either exercises the power by will or fails to exercise it. In a
situation where the power is created in the donor's will and the donee
exercises by will or fails to exercise, it would appear that an inheri-
tance tax could be levied under subsection 2 and again under sub-
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section 1. However, this has never been done in Kentucky; and, ap-
parently, if the tax is levied under subsection 2 when the donor dies,
there will be no levy under subsection 1. If for some reason there was
no tax levied under subsection 2 on the death of the donor, then it
will be picked up under subsection 1 on the death of the donee. The
rates and exemptions applied in this situation are those in effect at
the donor's death.
From the above, it would appear that Kentucky follows substantive
property law in viewing the process of transfer via a power of appoint-
ment as a single transfer from the donor to appointees or takers. But
for tax purposes two transfers or taxable events are recognized by
statute so as to insure that the single transfer is taxed. If this is the
case then the theory must be that since the beneficiary only receives
the property one time and since an inheritance tax is a tax imposed on
his right to receive property, it would be unjust to tax that right
twice.
It would seem that this is a situation where Kentucky should, like
the federal statute, draw a distinction between general and special
powers of appointment and tax them differently. If this distinction
were made, special powers of appointment would be taxed as indicated
in the preceding paragraph. However, a general power of appoint-
ment is the equivalent of a fee ownership in the donee and, therefore,
the equivalent of a complete transfer from the donor to the donee.
Viewed in this manner, the inheritance tax should be levied under sub-
section 2 on the donee beneficiary's right to receive the property from
the decedent donor. Then when the donee passes the property on his
death, by exercise or default, a tax should be levied against the ap-
pointee's or takers right to receive the property from the decedent
donee. This would seem to be a better approach and a court could so
hold undr this provision as it now stands. However, general and special
powers of appointment consistently have been taxed in the same
manner and the Department of Revenue has been satisfied if a tax
was levied on the donor's death.
A discussion of the relevant federal provision would not be worth-
while in light of the detail that would be required to make it meaning-
ful and the substantial difference in the manner of taxing powers of
appointment. However, Chart 4, an attempt to schematically sum-
marize what has been said about KRS § 140.040, does not lend itself to
a brief and basic comparison. Perhaps a few comments on the chart
would be helpful.
(1) The Kentucky statute makes no distinction between general
and special powers; they are taxed alike. The federal statute
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CREATION: DONOR TO DONEE
KIND OF POWER TIME OF CONVEYANCE FEDERAL KENTUCKY
General or Inter Vivos Gift tax No tax
Special Testamentary Est tax lanb tax
EXERCISE: DONEE TO
APPOINTEES OR TAKERS
General Inter Vivos Exercise Gift tax No tax
Testamentary Exercise Est tax Inh. tax
Non-Exercise Est tax Inh. tax
Special Inter Vivos Exercise No tax No tax
Testamentary Exercise No tax Inh+ tax
Non-Exercise No tax Inh. tax
Chart 4
Taxation Of Powers Of Appointment
makes a distinction but it is only meaningful when there has
been a transfer from the donee to the appointee or takers.
(2) Kentucky has no gift tax but the federal statute does. Con-
sequently, all inter vivos transfers will be subject to the federal
gift tax except the inter vivos exercise of a special power of
appointment.
(3) If property passes by the inter vivos or testamentary exercise
or non-exercise of a special power of appointment, the value
of the property will not be included in the gross estate of the
donee under the federal estate tax.
(4) Where the chart indicates that a transfer is subject to the
federal gift tax, it may also be subject to the federal estate
tax if it would be includible under § § 2035 through 2038
(this was not indicated on the chart).
(5) Non-exercised powers are subject to the Kentucky inheritance
tax. However, only a non-exercised general power is subject
to the federal estate tax.
(6) The treatment of powers of appointment under section 204161
of the Code depends on the date the power was created.012
Chart 4 indicates the treatment of powers of appointment
created after October 21, 1942.
61 CODE § 2041 is limited to the taxing of donated powers, i.e. it specifies
the circumstances under which the value of the property subject to the power will
be included in the gross estate of the donee. Retained interests are taxed under
§ §2036-2038.
62 The difference in treatment under CODE § 2041 can be briefly summarized.
The release or non-exercise of a general power of appointment created on or be-
fore October 21, 1942 is not taxable. Release or non-exercise after that date is
treated as an exercise and taxable. Additionally, if a general power created on
or before October 21, 1942 was reduced to a special power before November 1,
1951 it will be treated as a special power and non-taxable. If it was reduced to a
special power after that date it will be treated as the exercise of a general power
and taxable.
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RATES
The Kentucky inheritance tax rates are listed in KRS § 140.070.
The rates are divided into classes and the applicable class will depend
upon the relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent. There are
three classes of beneficiaries provided for in the statute. Class A in-
cludes members of the immediate family, going all the way through
to the grandchildren. It also includes adopted children, if adopted
when infants, 3 and stepchildren. Class B includes brothers and sisters,
aunts and uncles, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, nieces and nephews.
Class C includes everyone not in Class A or B. Rates are lower in
Class A than in B and lower in B than in C.
The problem under this provision and its solution were discussed
under powers of appointment. The problem, of course, is that this
type of classification makes it impossible to determine the rates and
exemptions until the beneficiary is known. It will be recalled that the
solution under the Kentucky statute is to choose the most likely
beneficiary and make adjustments later if someone else receives the
property.
It should be noted that the rates are set in such a way as to subject
even small inheritances to the tax. Thus in the many situations where
there is no federal estate tax imposed on the decedent's estate there
will nevertheless be an inheritance tax imposed on his beneficiaries.
However, the inheritance tax rates only run to 16 per cent whereas the
federal rates run as high as 77 per cent."
ExElvoNrlONs
The exemptions from the Kentucky inheritance tax are listed in
KRS § 140.080. They are based to some extent upon the rate classes.
The wife or infant child get a $10,000 exemption. All others in Class
A get a $5,000 exemption. Persons in Class B get $1,000 and those in
Class C get $500. The exemptions are subtracted from the benefiiciary's
share before the tax is calculated.
Where the decedent dies intestate, KRS § 391.030(1) (6) becomes
applicable. This is the homestead provision and under it personal
property or money up to $1,500 is exempt for the benefit of the
decedents widow and infant children. It should be pointed out that the
63 At common law a child is an infant until he reaches the age of majority.
KRS § 2.015 (1968) changed the age of majority in Kentucky from twenty-one
years of age to eighteen. This provision has been effective since June 18, 1968.
64 CoDE § 2001.
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homestead exemption is written in terms of widows and children but
not husbands.
DEDuCTIoNS
The Kentucky inheritance tax deductions listed in KRS § 140.090
are a separate and distinct category from the exemptions. The relation-
ship between the decedent and the beneficiaries is not a factor; rather,
the deductions are specifically named items which may be deducted.
The deductions are debts of the decedent, accrued taxes, federal estate
taxes, funeral expenses, executor's commissions and costs of admini-
stering the estate of the decedent including the attorney fees. The
attorney fees are limited to those actually paid.
There is a charitable deduction statute in Kentucky65 with much
the same type of provisions as the federal statute.66 It is limited to
charitable, educational, or religious purposes, but also includes trans-
fers to cities, towns and public institutions in this state for public
purposes. There is the requirement that none of the officers, members
or stockholders of the charitable organization can be receiving a
pecuniary profit from its operations.
CREDrr FOR TAx ON PmoR TRANSFERs
KRS § 140.095 allows the legatee a credit against the inheritance
tax if the property was transferred to his immediate decedent within
five years and a tax paid on that transfer. For the legatee to be entitled
to this credit, the property must be identified as having been so trans-
ferred and taxed, or identified as the property exchanged for such
property. If part of the previously taxed property is conveyed to more
than one beneficiary, the credit allowable is divided among the several
beneficiaries, in proportion to the amount of the previously taxed
property received. The credit is limited to the extent that it shall not
exceed an amount equal to such proportion of the total tax due as the
value of the previously taxed property bears to the value of all
property transferred to the legatee.
ADDITIONAL TAX
If after calculating the tax as provided in all the other provisions,
the inheritance taxes paid are less than the maximum allowable
credit under the federal estate tax,67 there is an additional amount due
65KRS § 140.060 (1954).
6 6 CODE § 2055.
67 CODE § 2053(d) (1).
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equal to the difference between the tax due and the credit.68 This
serves merely to get the state part of the federal tax.
DISCOUNT
KRS § 140.210 provides for a discount of five per cent if the tax is
paid within nine months of the decedents death. It also provides that
no interest will be due if the taxes are paid within eighteen months,
but a penalty of ten per cent per annum will be charged thereafter.
The ten per cent penalty is reduced to a six per cent per annum
charge when the delay is unavoidable or due to the litigation of a claim
against the estate.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to explain the Kentucky inheritance tax
provisions through a comparison with their estate tax counterparts
in the federal Code. The comparison reveals several areas in which
the Kentucky tax law is in need of revision. If the present inheritance
tax system is to be maintained, the provision dealing with powers of
appointment needs to be revised, and new provisions dealing with
annuities and retained reversionary interests need to be enacted.
The best solution, however, would be to abandon the inheritance
tax structure altogther and to replace it with an estate tax system69
along the lines of the federal Code. The deterring factors to such a
change would be the initial cost involved and the fact that no dif-
ferentiation among classes of beneficiaries is possible with an estate
tax. It is submitted that these factors are offset by the reduction in
administrative costs, the ultimate increase in revenue, and the fact
that such a tax structure would be more easily understood by tax-
payers, lawyers, accountants and trust officers. These are the people
most directly affected by death tax laws and they should be able to
determine in advance the tax consequences which will result from
the use of various estate planning devices.
Andrew M. Winkler7"
0S KRS § 140.180 (1942).
09 The Legislative Research Commission has already drafted a "Proposed
Kentucky Estate Tax Statute," COMMONWEALTH OF KENTucKy LEGISLATIVE RE-
SEACHi CoM2vssIoN, INHERTANCE AND ESTATE TAXATION IN KENUucKY 59-89
(1961).
70 Editor's Comment: This note is the product of extensive personal research
and analysis of the Kentucky inheritance tax law by the author, but it should be
pointed out that Mr. Winkler used an unpublished note written by Robert L.
Fears as a model for much of his research. Mr. Fears' note was based on an
idea developed by Gary Conn, John T. Mandt, and Charles Marshall. [Mr. Fears
is a 1969 graduate of the University of Kentucky College of Law; Mr. Con, Mr.
Mandt and Mr. Marshall are 1968 graduates of the University of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law. All are former staff members of the Kentucky Law Journal.]
